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COMMENTS
PRECOMPLAINT INVESTIGATIONS UNDER THE
KENTUCKY CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT:
VALIDITY AND SCOPE OF THE CIVIL
INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND
INTRODUCTION
With the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act' in
1972, Kentucky embarked on its first serious attempt at pro-
tecting the consuming public.2 The Act established a Division
of Consumer Protection under the Attorney General in the
Department of Law3 with power to conduct investigations of
matters affecting the marketplace and to take appropriate ac-
tion.4 False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce were declared unlawful, 5 and
injunctive6 and restitutionary remedies as well as civil penal-
ties' for violations of the statute were provided.9
Since the Act's inception, the Division of Consumer Pro-
tection has increasingly expanded its activities on behalf of
Kentucky consumers.10 This expansion, while statutorily au-
I Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 367.110-.300 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 For analysis of the state of consumer protection in Kentucky prior to the adop-
tion of the Consumer Protection Act, see Note, Can the Kentucky Consumer Forget
Caveat Emptor and Find True Happiness?, 58 Ky. L.J. 325 (1970).
3 KRS § 367.120 (Supp. 1976). A Division of Consumer Protection has been oper-
ating in the Attorney General's Office since 1965, but without specific statutory recog-
nition until the adoption of the Consumer Protection Act.
KRS § 367.150(3) (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 367.170 (Supp. 1976). This section was amended in 1976 to prohibit also
"unfair" acts or practices. A new section, KRS § 367.175, was added to the Consumer
Protection Act in 1976 declaring contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of trade or commerce unlawful. See note 12 infra.
I KRS § 367.190 (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 367.200-.220 (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 367.990 (Supp. 1976).
For an in-depth analysis of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, see Com-
ment, The Kentucky Consumer Protection Act-True Happiness?, 61 Ky. L.J. 793
(1973).
" The Division exercises a wide variety of functions, powers, and duties author-
ized by KRS § 367.150. In addition to enforcing the prohibition against unfair, false,
misleading, or deceptive acts or practices, the Division drafts and recommends con-
sumer legislation; appears before legislative and administrative committees; inter-
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thorized, has resulted primarily from external forces not likely
to wane. Increased public contact with the Division" and the
General Assembly's further adoption of wide-ranging consumer
legislation' 2 signal a growing awareness of the need for con-
sumer protection in the marketplace and insure a concomitant
increase in the activities and responsibilities of the Division of
Consumer Protection.
Coexistent with the Division's functions and duties are
broad investigative powers 13 delegated to the Attorney General
as a necessary component of law enforcement and administra-
tion. These powers are an essential means of protecting both
the consumer and the honest businessman, for an effective and
venes on behalf of consumers in utility ratemaking proceedings; promotes consumer
education programs; and operates a consumer complaint mediation service. This activ-
ity has been channeled into three distinct sections of the Division: fraud litigation,
utility intervention, and consumer services. At present the full-time Division staff is
composed of 10 attorneys, 2 paralegal consumer protection specialists to mediate con-
sumer complaints, 1 consumer education specialist, 1 research analyst for utility inter-
vention, 2 investigators, and 12 secretarial and clerical assistants. To appreciate fully
the growth of the Division staff in the past 4 years, cf. Comment, supra note 9, at 795.
" In 1971, the year before the Consumer Protection Act was adopted, the Division
received 279 consumer complaints. CONsuMERs' ADvISORY COUNCIL, STATE OF CONSUMER
AFFAIRS IN KENTUCKY 31 (1973). By 1975, during the third year of operation under the
statute, the number of written complaints had increased to 3,949. In addition to these
written complaints, the Division also received 15,143 telephone calls from its statewide
tollfree consumer "hotline." CONSUMERS' ADvISORY COUNCIL, STATE OF CONSUMER AF-
FAIRS IN KENTUCKY 43 (1975).
12 In 1976 the General Assembly passed the following bills commonly referred to
as the "Consumer Package": HB 114, prohibiting "unfair" acts or practices in trade
or commerce; HB 194, requiring a pharmacist to select the least expensive generic drug
therapeutically equivalent to the one prescribed by a physician; HB 322, prohibiting
tampering with odometers in motor vehicles; HB 371, prohibiting home solicitation
sales of hearing aids; HB 644, repealing the Fair Trade Law and prohibiting contracts,
combinations, and other agreements in restraint of trade; HB 652, requiring an
automobile dealer to furnish the prospective purchaser of a used car with the name,
address, and phone number, if available, of the previous consumer-owner of the car;
SB 188, providing consumer relief for purchase of mobile homes deemed nonmerchant-
able; SB 220, abolishing the holder-in-due-course defense in consumer credit contracts;
SB 346, providing citizen members for state professional and occupational licensing
boards and commissions; SB 367, limiting payments to professional fund raisers for
charities to 15 percent of the amount contributed. In addition HJR 73 authorized the
Department of Education to study and evaluate the effectiveness of consumer educa-
tion in Kentucky. A comprehensive antitrust bill (HB 646) was passed by the General
Assembly but was vetoed by Governor Carroll. See generally LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
COMMISSION, GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION, REGULAR SESSION, 1976 (Informational Bulle-
tin No. 113. 1976). See also note 114 infra.
13 KRS § 367.240-.290 (Supp. 1976).
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responsible consumer protection program is grounded on its
ability to obtain the facts on which to act. 4
Despite the growing public and legislative awareness of the
need for effective consumer protection, and despite the broad
range of powers conferred by the Consumer Protection Act, the
Attorney General's investigative authority under the Act has
been the subject of recent litigation in Kentucky courts. This
litigation has focused on the Attorney General's authority to
issue a civil investigative demand to determine whether unfair,
false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices have been com-
mitted.'5 The Kentucky Supreme Court's recent interpretation
of this authority will have significant effects not only on the
Consumer Protection Division's investigative power but also on
the investigated party's due process rights. This Comment will
examine the statutory and case authority for the Attorney Gen-
eral's power under the Consumer Protection Act to issue civil
investigative demands and will analyze the Supreme Court's
interpretation of that authority.
I. CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMANDS: THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The civil investigative demand is a relatively new investi-
gative discovery device. Similar to an administrative sub-
poena,'6 the investigative demand provides a precomplaint pro-
" The Attorney General's alternatives, if such power were not available, have
been previously summarized:
(1) [H]e can cease pursuing those schemes whose violation of the law is
most difficult to prove, thereby allowing even more citizens to be defrauded;
(2) he can bring court action with insufficient evidence and risk not only
failing his burden of proof but also injuring the reputation of an innocent
corporation; (3) he can allow the fraudulent company to continue to deceive
and damage its customers while his staff diligently pieces together the neces-
sary proof from the victims after they had been harmed; or (4) he can appro-
priate the bulk of his budget to hiring investigators even though the money
comes from the same people being defrauded by those under investigation,
the public.
Note, supra note 2, at 365. See also Comment, supra note 9, at 809-10.
' KRS § 367.240 (Supp. 1976).
' Subpoena power is frequently granted administrative agencies by statute to
compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, re-
cords, papers, and other documentary evidence relevant to matters under investiga-
tion. Depending on the statute, such power may be granted for general administrative
investigations as well as administrative hearings in aid of investigation. See generally
1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW 294-96 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CooPER];
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cedure by which the Attorney General can obtain relevant in-
formation, documentary material, and physical evidence from
any person or business* under investigation to determine
whether a violation of law has been committed. While the civil
investigative demand was originally conceived to enable the
federal Department of Justice to obtain documentary evidence
during the course of civil antitrust investigations, 7 more re-
cently the device has been included in state consumer protec-
tion statutes to facilitate the enforcement of consumer protec-
tion laws.
An investigative demand enables a consumer protection
agency to obtain information before a determination is made
to bring suit without the need for formal adversary confronta-
tion.'" Furthermore, an investigative demand operates rather
informally and confidentially between the agency and the busi-
ness community, thereby protecting the legitimate interests of
honest businessmen. 9 As a result, explicit provision for investi-
gative demands has been included in the Unfair Trade Prac-
tices and Consumer Protection Law,"0 which has become a
model for most consumer protection legislation. The vast ma-
jority of states currently provide for an investigative demand 2'
Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALE L.J. 1111 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as Davis]; 1 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 89 (1962).
17 The Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1962), gave the Attorney
General this authority. For the legislative history of the Act and discussion of earlier
attempts to authorize civil investigative demands in antitrust investigations, see 1962
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2568; see also Perry and Simon, The Civil Investigative
Demand: New Fact-Finding Powers for the Antitrust Division, 58 MICH. L. REV. 855
(1960); Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963). Prior to
the adoption of the Antitrust Civil Process Act, Washington and Hawaii provided for
civil investigative demands in their antitrust statutes, while 15 other states provided
for some means of precomplaint antitrust investigation. Comment, Recent Antitrust
Developments: Civil Investigative Demand-Needed Weapon or Undue Power for Pro-
secuting Agencies?, 37 WASH. L. REV. 278 (1962).
, 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2568.
" Brief for Appellant at 6, Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Pineur, 533 S.W.
2d 527 (Ky. 1976).
20 This Act, initially proposed by the Federal Trade Commission, was included in
the 1970 Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments. See
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES 31-39 (1970).
21 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110d (Rev. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2514 (Rev.
1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 106-1213 (Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 48-611 (Supp. 1975); KRS
§ 367.240 (Supp. 1976); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1411 (Supp. 1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-
24-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 407.040 (Vernon Supp. 1976); MONT. REV.
CODE § 85-410 (Supp. 1975); NES. REV. STAT. § 59-1611 (Curi. Supp. 1974); NEV. REV.
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or similar precomplaint procedure2 as an integral part of the
investigative powers of their consumer protection statutes.
Under Kentucky's Consumer Protection Act, the Attorney
General can serve an investigative demand in either one of two
instances: (1) When he "has reason to believe" that a person
has engaged in an act or practice declared unlawful by KRS §
367.110-.300; or (2) when he "believes it to be in the public
interest" that an investigation should be made to determine
whether a person has engaged in an act or practice declared
unlawful by KRS § 367.110-.300.2 While the statute supple-
ments this investigative authority with provisions for adminis-
trative subpoenas" and judicial impoundment of evidence,5
the investigative demand represents the initial fact-finding
capability of the Division of Consumer Protection."
Although the statute provides the Attorney General with
STAT. § 598A-100 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-10 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 757 (Supp. 1976); ORE. REv. STAT. § 646.618 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §
201-6 (Purdon 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-7 (Supp. 1975); S.D.C.L. § 37-24-12 (Rev.
1972); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.61 (Vernon Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. §
59.1-9.10 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.110 (1974).
22 States not explicitly providing for an investigative demand generally rely on
subpoenas, requests for written statements under oath, and orders for production of
documentary material to obtain information relevant to an investigation. ALAS. STAT.
§ 45.50.495 (Supp. 1975); Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1524 (Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. §
70-909 (Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-107 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.206
(Supp. 1976); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 487-9 (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 /, §
263 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 713.24 (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-631 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 211 (Supp. 1976); MD. CODE ANN.
§ 13-405 (1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 6 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.907
(Supp. 1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:8 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-3
(1964); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-9
(1975); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-15-04 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.06 (Page
Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE § 8-800.376 (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-16 (Supp.
1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2460 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-7-104 (1976);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 426.106 (1974).
1 KRS § 367.240 (Supp. 1976).
21 KRS § 367.250 (Supp. 1976).
2 KRS § 367.270 (Supp. 1976). To impound evidence the Attorney General must
show "probable cause" to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred and that the
information requested cannot be obtained during the course of an investigation. See
note 66 infra.
28 In addition to the Attorney General's authority to issue investigative demands,
an Investigations Unit for the Attorney General's Office was established in 1974 to
investigate, among other things, matters indicating false, misleading, or deceptive acts
or practices. CONSUMERS' ADVISORY COUNCIL, STATE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS IN KENTUCKY
13 (1974).
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authority to seek judicial enforcement of investigative de-
mands,27 the investigated party is provided with safeguards to
protect him from abuse. The party under investigation may
apply to a circuit court for judicial protection against any un-
reasonable investigative action of the Attorney General,28 or for
a court order setting aside, modifying, or extending the return
date of a demand. 29 Information obtained pursuant to a de-
mand shall not be made public or disclosed beyond the extent
necessary for law enforcement purposes in the public interest. 0
Finally any person charged with failing to answer the investiga-
tive demand shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing on
the merits of the demand before issuance of any final order.31
Despite the similarity in procedure, Kentucky's provision
for issuance of investigative demands differs in three important
respects from other typical statutes. The Kentucky Act does
not require an investigative demand to be issued upon "proba-
ble cause" that a violation of law has occurred 32 or to state the
nature of the alleged violation under investigation. 3 Nor does
the Kentucky Act disqualify use of information obtained pur-
suant to the investigation in any criminal prosecution of the
witness.34 The fourth and fifth amendment 5 issues raised by
v KRS § 367.290 (Supp. 1976).
21 KRS § 367.260 (Supp. 1976).
- KRS § 367.240(2) (Supp. 1976).
34 KRS § 367.250 (Supp. 1976).
3' KRS § 367.290(2) (Supp. 1976).
22 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 48-611 (Supp. 1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.06
(Page Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE § 8-800.376 (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-7-
104 (1976). The Kentucky statute requires only that the Attorney General have "reason
to believe" that a violation has occurred or that an investigation is in the public
interest. KRS § 367.240 (Supp. 1976).
' See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2514 (Rev. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §
201-6 (Purdon 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.10 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REv. CODE §
19.86.110 (1974).
3' See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1411 (Supp. 1976); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 407.040
(Vernon Supp. 1976); NEB. Ray. STAT. § 59-1611 (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-15-10 (Supp. 1975).
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. V:
1976]
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these omissions form the backdrop for the development of con-
stitutional standards by which valid administrative investiga-
tions are judged.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS: THE MODERN TEST OF
VALIDITY
Although the investigative powers of an administrative
agency are dependent upon statutory authority, such power
has been viewed as essential to the proper performance of ad-
ministrative tasks 5 The proper scope of such authority, how-
ever, has been the subject of countless judicial decisions, evolv-
ing from a narrow conception of administrative authority to a
recognition of the pervasive influence of administrative bod-
ies.37
Early decisions, reflecting concern for fourth amendment
protections of privacy, confined investigative authority to for-
mal adjudication or complaint proceedings" or where there was
probable cause to believe the law had been violated. 39 These
No person shall . .. be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.
1' Davis, supra note 16, at 1111:
Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule-
making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising
and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending legislation,
and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out
what if anything should be done.
37 For more thorough discussions of this development, see, e.g., Benton,
Administrative Subpoena Enforcement, 41 Tax. L. REv. 874 (1963); Davis, supra note
16; Hoffman, Industry Reports to Administrative Agencies-Some Legal Problems, 18
ADM. L. REV. 80 (1965); Withrow, Investigatory Powers of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion-Constitutional and Statutory Limitations, 24 FED. BAR J. 456 (1964); Comment,
Enforcement of the Administrative Subpoena: An Abdication of Judicial Inquiry, 27
ALBANY L. REV. 239 (1963); Comment, Investigatory Power of an Administrative
Agency, 44 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 50 (1967). See generally 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINsrRATIVE LAW
§§ 3.01-.14 (1958); 1 AM. JUR.2d Administrative Law §§ 85-91 (1962).
11 In Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908), the Supreme Court held the Interstate
Commerce Commission could not issue subpoenas in investigations authorized to aid
in recommending legislation. In FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284 Fed. 886 (D. Md.
1922), aff'd, 267 U.S. 586 (1924), the Federal Trade Commission was denied authority
to compel production of records in a Senate-authorized general investigation into the
relationship between prices of grain at the farm and export prices. See also FTC v.
Claire Furnace Co., 285 Fed. 936 (App. D.C. 1923), rev'd on other grounds, 274 U.S.
160 (1927).
11 In FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924), the Supreme Court held
that absent a showing of materiality or relevancy, the Federal Trade Commission had
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decisions, applying the limitations of judicial investigatory
power to administrative agencies, concluded that the right to
privacy could be sacrificed only when the investigation con-
cerned a specific breach of the law.4" The proliferation of ad-
ministrative agencies and Congress' repeated authorization of
administrative investigations unrelated to law enforcement
and adjudication" provoked a reappraisal of administrative
investigative power, influencing later court decisions to con-
centrate not on whether there was probable cause to believe the
information demanded would prove a violation of law,42 but
whether the subject matter of the inquiry pertained to a topic
the official had been empowered to investigate.
4 3
This changing judicial attitude was climaxed by two Su-
preme Court cases, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling4 and United States v. Morton Salt Co.,45 which de-
fined the conceptual and constitutional limits of administra-
tive investigative power. Although 4 years separated the two
decisions, common issues in both cases46 welded their holdings
no right of access to requested materials to determine existence of statutory violations.
Investigations not based on specific grounds were struck down as "fishing expeditions."
See also Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
40 Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. at 419-20.
" As administrative agencies increased in number, Congress repeatedly conferred
upon these agencies investigative power related not only to law enforcement and adju-
dication but also to rule-making, recommending legislation, and other purposes. Davis,
supra note 16, at 1122.
42 In Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that when an
administrative agency was authorized to regulate and supervise the acts and practices
of an industry, it could investigate regardless of whether there was any pre-existing
probable cause to believe that there had been violations of the law.
11 In Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943), the Supreme Court
departed from its past limitations on administrative investigations and upheld a sub-
poena issued by the Secretary of Labor, holding that "[t]he evidence sought by the
subpoena was not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the Secre-
tary in the discharge of her duties under the Act." Id. at 509.
" 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
338 U.S. 632 (1950).
" In Oklahoma Press, the administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor sought judicial enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum, seeking
records to determine whether certain newspaper publishing corporations were violating
the Fair Labor Standards Act. In Morton Salt, several salt producers were required to
submit compliance reports to the Federal Trade Commission in conjunction with a
court decree ordering them to cease and desist from stated practices in connection with
the pricing, producing, and marketing of salt. The Commission ordered additional and
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into a comprehensive test for judging the validity of adminis-
trative investigations. Accordingly, the two cases should be
examined together rather than chronologically.
The underlying theme of Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt
was a basic distinction between the fact-finding capabilities of
the judicial process and those of the administrative process.
Both decisions departed from the early judicial limitations
placed on administrative investigations, and in so doing, con-
structed a new theory of the nature of administrative investiga-
tive authority.
In Oklahoma Press, the Court viewed administrative in-
vestigatory authority as power delegated by the legislative
branch to investigate possible violations of law.47 This investi-
gative function was compared to general legislative investiga-
tive power s and grand jury inquisitorial authority to search out
violations of the law. In the Court's view, valid administrative
investigative authority, as derived from delegated legislative
power, should be judged not by the pendency of a complaint
or specific charge of violation of the law or the probable out-
come of the investigation, but rather by a determination that
the investigation "is for a lawfully authorized purpose within
the power of Congress to command."4
Morton Salt made the nature of this authority even more
explicit. The Court drew a distinction between the accusatorial
nature of the judicial process and the inquisitorial nature of the
administrative process. Since judicial power is restricted to
adjudication of cases and controversies, judicial investigative
powers are likewise confined to those ends. The administrative
agency, however, is expected to take the lead in ascertaining
what proceedings should be set in motion and follow through
to effective results. 5 In analyzing administrative investigative
highly particularized reports not authorized by the decree and sought judicial enforce-
ment of the order.
" The very purpose of the .. . authorized investigation is to discover
and procure evidence, not to prove a pending charge or complaint, but upon
which to make one if, in the Administrator's judgment, the facts thus discov-
ered should justify doing so.
327 U.S. at 201.
1' Legislative investigatory power, like administrative investigatory power, is of
relatively recent vintage. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
" 327 U.S. at 209.
338 U.S. at 640-42.
[Vol. 65
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authority, the Court adopted the grand jury analogy suggested
in Oklahoma Press.5' This inquisitorial theory of administra-
tive investigations, alluded to in Oklahoma Press and given
explicit sanction in Morton Salt, underscored the Court's basic
conception of administrative investigatory power.
Having conceptually removed administrative investiga-
tions from the restrictions inherent in the judicial process, the
cases sought to square administrative investigations with the
fourth amendment. Defendants in both cases argued that infor-
mational demands in the absence of a prior charge or com-
plaint constituted "fishing expeditions" to see if evidence of
guilt could be uncovered and thus violated the fourth amend-
ment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Morton Salt decision completely destroyed the vital-
ity of the "fishing expedition" argument. The Court bottomed
its opinion on the assumption that the Federal Trade Commis-
sion was only seeking information to see if it could find viola-
tions of law. The Court nevertheless upheld the order in the
broadest of language.
52
The Court in Oklahoma Press directly approached the
fourth amendment issue. The Court disagreed that the infor-
mational demands created an actual search and seizure.
53
51 The only power that is involved here is the power to get information
from those who best can give it and who are most interested in not doing so.
Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until
it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, it does not follow that an
administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may
not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. It has a power of inquisition,
if one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the judicial function.
It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or
controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion
that the law is being violated, or even because it wants assurance that it is
not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to
an administrative body, it, too, may take steps to inform itself as to whether
there is probable violation of the law.
Id. at 642-43.
52 Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as
caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing
agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior
is consistent with the law and the public interest.
Id. at 652.
53 No officer or other person has sought to enter petitioners' premises
against their will, to search them, or to seize or examine their books, records,
or papers without their assent, otherwise than pursuant to orders of court
19761
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Agency requests for information, said the Court, are only "fig-
urative" or "constructive" searches and seizures and thus only
analogically and tangentially bound by the fourth amendment.
Following the rationale of the inquisitorial nature of adminis-
trative investigative authority, the Court dismissed the re-
quirement of probable cause and framed the elements suffi-
cient to satisfy the prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures in a three-fold test: (1) The investigation is one
the agency is authorized by law to make; (2) the documents
sought are relevant to the inquiry; and (3) the documents are
particularized with adequate specificity.54
Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt marked a wateished in
the development of administrative investigative power. De-
parting from the early limitations applied to administrative
investigations, Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt established
guidelines which reflected the modern concept of administra-
tive enforcement of laws committed to agency administration.
After Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt, an administrative
agency need not show a prior charge or complaint or pending
administrative proceeding to authorize an investigation, nor
must the agency establish probable cause that a violation of
law has occurred. The range of investigative power given to an
administrative body is sufficient "if the inquiry, is within the
authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite, and
the information sought is reasonably relevant."55 A quarter of
a century later, this test has become the controlling guide in
judging the validity of all types of administrative investiga-
tions. 6
and made after opportunity to present objections, which in fact were made.
327 U.S. at 195.
" Id. at 208-09.
" United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652.
" The commentaries cited supra note 37 provide discussions of several cases which
have applied the Oklahoma Press-Morton Salt test. To appreciate the enduring na-
ture of this test, as applied in more recent cases, see, e.g., United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48 (1964); SEC v. Howatt, 525 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1975); Federal Maritime
Comm'n v. Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188
(7th Cir. 1975); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. University of New Mex-
ico, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d
1047 (2d Cir. 1973); Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1971); SEC v.
Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1970); Petition of Gold Bond
Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964);
[Vol. 65
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III. CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMANDS: THE KENTUCKY PERSPECTIVE
The civil investigative demand, designed as a precom-
plaint, preadjudicative device for obtaining information, is a
product of the modern approach to administrative investiga-
tions. Since the investigative demand is such a recent discovery
tool, courts interpreting the validity of investigative demands
have cast their decisions within the modern judicial perspec-
tive .5 This judicial attitude toward administrative investiga-
tions,58 particularly with investigative demands, has produced
a settled rule not to burden the agency with requirements other
than to show agency authority to investigate and to request
reasonably definite and relevant information.
Despite the widespread application of the Oklahoma
Press-Morton Salt standard to administrative investigations,
two recent Kentucky circuit court decisions refusing to enforce
civil investigative demands issued by the Attorney General
under the Consumer Protection Act apparently rejected or ig-
nored the modern standard established by Oklahoma Press,
Morton Salt, and their progeny. The Kentucky Supreme
Court's reversal of these decisions embraced the modern stan-
dard and insured the Attorney General the full sweep of his
investigative powers under the-Consumer Protection Act.
Fielder v. Berkeley Properties Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 791 (Cal. App. 1972); Ajello v. Hart-
ford Fed. Say. & Loan, 347 A.2d 113 (Conn. 1975); Mobile Oil Corp. v. Killian, 301
A.2d 562 (Conn. 1973); In re Blue Hen Country Network, Inc., 314 A.2d 197 (Del. 1973);
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Lopez, 531 P.2d 455 (Kan. 1975); Commonwealth
ex rel. Hancock v. Pineur, 533 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens
v. Herb Jones Chevrolet, Inc., No. 76-144 (Ky. S. Ct. Oct. 15, 1976); Myers v. Hol-
shouser, 214 S.E.2d 630 (N.C. 1975); Steele v. State ex rel. Gorton, 537 P.2d 782 (Wash.
1975).
' The validity of the civil investigative demand procedure of the Antitrust Civil
Process Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1962), was upheld in Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co.,
221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964), relying on
Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt. For other cases construing civil investigative de-
mands under the Antitrust Civil Process Act, see ANNOT., 10 A.L.R.Fed. 677 (1972).
In Steele v. State ex rel. Gorton, 537 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1975), the civil investigative
demand procedure of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, similar to Kentucky's
Consumer Protection Act, was upheld on the basis of the Oklahoma Press-Morton
Salt standard.
" For a concise, albeit partisan, discussion of the development of administrative
investigative authority, see Brief for Appellant at 10-24, Commonwealth ex rel. Han-
cock v. Pineur, 533 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1976).
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A. Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Pineur
On July 25, 1975, Madison Circuit Court Judge James
Chenault granted a protective order59 to Louis Pineur as corpo-
ration officer or process agent for several Whitehall Trailer con-
cerns after an investigative demand was issued" following 38
separate complaints made to the Division of Consumer Protec-
tion about the sales and service practices of the concerns.
Judge Chenault held that the Attorney General's failure to
state his "reasonable belief' on the face of the demand in the
form of a complaint or charge that the investigated party had
engaged in a false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice
made the investigative demand defective and thereby unen-
forceable.' The thrust of Judge Chenault's opinion was that
the recipient of an investigative demand must "have at least a
knowledge of the charge leveled against him or the claim made
against him before he is required to answer.
'6 2
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Commonwealth ex rel.
Hancock v. Pineur3 reversed Judge Chenault's decision, hold-
ing that neither the statutory provision of KRS § 367.2401 nor
constitutional standards65 required a showing of grounds or fac-
tual details on the face of an investigative demand 6 "in order
.' Pineur v. Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock, Civil No. 8475 (Madison Cir. Ct.,
July 25, 1975).
0 The investigative demand requested inter alia a statement of all officers of
Whitehall Trailer concerns; lists of manufacturers and suppliers; names and addresses
of banks and finance companies to which consumer contracts were assigned; copies of
promotional information and advertisements used by the business; names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of salespersons, agents, employees, repairmen, and representa-
tives employed since June 16, 1972, and reason for their termination from employment
if no longer employed; names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all Kentucky
consumers who purchased mobile homes from Whitehall concerns; copies of all corre-
spondence from Kentucky consumers; and copies of all warranty claims or repair
requests. In addition the demand requested that a representative of the various White-
hall concerns be made available for questioning concerning the sales, repair, and
delivery aspects of the business. Record at 7-8, Pineur v. Commonwealth ex rel. Han-
cock, Civil No. 8475 (Madison Cir. Ct. July 25, 1975).
,Id. at 46-47.
62 Id. at 46.
533 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1976).
, See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
6 The Court per Justice Palmore quoted extensively from United States v. Morton
Salt Co. and cited with approval its threefold test for the validity of administrative
investigations.
11 Compare KRS § 367.240 (Supp. 1976) with KRS § 367.270 (Supp. 1976) which
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that it may be determined. . . that the grounds upon which
the Attorney General has acted are in fact reasonable." 7 The
Court's holding was buttressed by the statutory provision for
court review of challenged investigative demands." To the
Court, this provision negated the argument that a determina-
tion of the reasonableness of a demand would be confined to
what is shown on its face.
Nothing in this procedure denies an aggrieved party access to
a court of law before he is deprived of anything. And, as in
any other case in which a plaintiff has been or is about to be
injured in his person or property, once he makes a prima facie
showing of facts entitling him to relief the defendant agency
has the onus of coming forward with a showing of reasonable
justification, else it runs the risk of an adverse judgment. 9
In adopting the Morton Salt requirement for valid administra-
tive investigations, the Court ruled that Kentucky courts could
determine the reasonableness of an investigative demand
based on the Morton Salt standard and need not be shown
reasonable grounds on the face of the demand.
The Pineur decision clearly cast the Kentucky civil inves-
tigative demand procedure within the modern perspective re-
garding administrative investigations. In its rush to correct er-
rors of law,70 however, the Court failed to consider the investi-
gated party's right to notice and apprisal of the purpose and
nature of the investigation."
requires the Attorney General to state in writing on his motion to the court for im-
poundment of evidence his grounds constituting "probable cause" to believe that a
person has engaged in an unlawful act or practice under the Consumer Protection Act
and that the information sought to be impounded will not be obtainable during the
course of any investigation authorized by the statute.
" 533 S.W.2d at 528.
KRS § 367.260 (Supp. 1976).
533 S.W.2d at 530.
T In equating the reasonableness of the demand with a showing of charge or
complaint made against the investigated party, Judge Chenault seemed to apply a
probable cause requirement to the issuance of the investigative demand long since
abandoned by the Oklahoma Press-Morton Salt line of cases. The court ignored not
only the Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt cases but also more recent cases upholding
the investigative powers of an Attorney General to issue an investigative demand under
state consumer protection statutes similar to Kentucky's. See, e.g., Steele v. State ex
rel. Gorton, 537 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1975); cf. State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot Interplane-
tary, Inc., 512 P.2d 416 (Kan. 1973).
71 See generally Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962); Deutsch v. United
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In Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Board,7" the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals per Judge Bazelon held that the
reasonableness of an order to produce evidence by an agency
"is dependent upon the relevancy of the information de-
manded, and that cannot be determined in the absence of a
statement of purpose. . . -73 In a companion case, Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Board," the court held that
mere recitals of statutory authority would not suffice as a pur-
pose for which the information was demanded.75 These cases
indicate that the relevance requirement of Oklahoma Press and
Morton Salt presupposes that the investigated party will have
been apprised of the nature and purpose of the investigation in
order to determine the relevance of the information de-
manded.
76
In Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co., 77 the court upheld a
civil investigative demand which stated in general terms the
nature of the conduct under investigation, 78 holding that "the
test is whether the statement in the demand as to the nature
States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
72 295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
11 Id. at 155.
74 295 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
71 In Hellenic Lines, the order to produce documentary material was prefaced with
the following statement:
That pursuant to the responsibilities vested in the Board by the aforemen-
tioned Shipping Act, 1916, and in the effectuation in the public interest of
the Board's regulatory duties under that Act, the Board needs the reports,
accounts, notes, charges, and memoranda of facts and transactions herein-
after described.
Id. at 140. Compare that defective statement of purpose with the prefatory statement
in the investigative demand issued to Louis Pineur:
Pursuant to KRS 367.240 you are hereby ordered to present, in writing and
under oath, at the time and place indicated below the following information,
documentary and/or physical evidence.
Record at 7, Pineur v. Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock, Civil No. 8475 (Madison Cir.
Ct. July 25, 1975). See also Record at 3, Herb Jones Chevrolet, Inc. v. Commonwealth
ex rel. Hancock, Civil No. 13,566-C (Hardin Cir. Ct., Oct. 28, 1975).
11 W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 495 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
GELLHORN & BYSE].
221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964).
' The Antitrust Civil Process Act § 1312(b) requires an investigative demand to
state the nature of the conduct under investigation and the provision of law applicable.
The investigative demand in Gold Bond stated that the conduct under investigation
was restrictive practices in the dispensing and supplying of trading stamps. 221 F.
Supp. at 397.
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of the investigation is sufficient to inform adequately the per-
son being investigated and sufficient to determine the rele-
vancy of the documents demanded for inspection.""9 More re-
cently, in Material Handling Institute, Inc. v. McLaren, 1 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a civil investigative
demand issued to determine possible violations of the antitrust
laws by a "contract or combination in unreasonable restraint
of trade."8' In holding this was a sufficient description of the
conduct under investigation as required by statute, the court
found that the Institute understood what conduct was under
investigation since there had been prior correspondence be-
tween the Justice Department and the business concerning
anticompetitive effects of the Institute's restrictive member-
ship practices.
The trial record in Pineur indicated that the complaints
received by the Division of Consumer Protection had been
made known to the Whitehall concerns through correspond-
ence initiated by the Division's mediation service 2 in attempt-
ing to mediate the complaints. Thus, while the demand itself
was silent about the nature of the conduct under investigation,
the substance of the requests in the demand coupled with
Whitehall's knowledge of the complaints would have been suf-
ficient to insure that the company knew what conduct was
under investigation. Thus the Court could have upheld the
investigative demand on the rationale of the Gold Bond-
Material Handling Institute cases without foreclosing the need
for some showing of the nature and purpose of the investigative
" Id.
426 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
" Id. at 92.
The Division's mediation service attempts to resolve differences between con-
sumers and businesses without recourse to the judicial process. After the Division
receives a consumer complaint, generally the complaint is made available to the busi-
ness through written correspondence from the Division to inform the business that the
consumer has a grievance. After the business responds to this initial correspondence,
the Division can offer suggestions on resolving the complaint. If the Division cannot
mediate a settlement of the consumer complaint, the Division must close the case and
refer the consumer to a private attorney of the consumer's choice. However, if there
are numerous complaints of business conduct, the Division can initiate an investiga-
tion to determine whether the conduct may be in violation of the Consumer Protection




demand. The Court's holding was unnecessarily broad and will
undoubtedly cause hardship to those persons who have not had
contact with the Division of Consumer Protection prior to the
issuance of an investigative demand.
B. Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. Herb Jones Chevrolet,
Inc.
On October 28, 1975, Hardin Circuit Court Judge J. How-
ard Holbert granted a protective order" to Herb Jones Chevro-
let, Inc. after a civil investigative demand was issueds" to deter-
mine whether the automobile dealership had engaged in over-
charging consumers for sales and usage tax on the purchase of
used automobiles. Judge Holbert held the investigative de-
mand void and unenforceable because it was a type of search
warrant issued without probable cause by a non-judicial offi-
cer, and because it violated the corporation's privilege against
self-incrimination.
85
In a memorandum opinion per curiam 8 the Kentucky
Supreme Court reversed Judge Holbert's decision, holding that
an investigative demand is not a search warrant and that fifth
amendment rights are not involved in a civil investigative de-
mand proceeding. In holding an investigative demand analo-
gous to a subpoena duces tecum, the Court quoted the Morton
Salt requirements for administrative investigations and con-
cluded that the Pineur decision was dispositive of the issues in
the case.
The Court's lack of analysis requires further discussion of
the fourth and fifth amendment issues raised in Herb Jones
11 Herb Jones Chevrolet, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock, Civil No. 13,566-
C (Hardin Cir. Ct., Oct. 28, 1975).
" The investigative demand requested inter alia names and addresses of sales
management and personnel, copies of interoffice memos or writings relating to prac-
tices of charging car buyers for sales or use taxes, and copies of interoffice audits or
accounting reports pertaining to dollar effect of charging car buyers for sales or use tax.
The demand also requested the company to make Mr. Herb Jones available for ques-
tioning concerning the company's practice of charging car buyers for sales and use tax,
and to make available for inspection all records pertaining to used car sales since June
16, 1972. Record at 3, Herb Jones Chevrolet, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock,
Civil No. 13,566-C (Hardin Cir. Ct., Oct. 28, 1975).
Id. at 81-83.
8' Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. Herb Jones Chevrolet, Inc., No. 76-144 (Ky.
S. Ct. Oct. 15, 1976).
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Chevrolet. The Court correctly resolved the fourth amendment
issue, but swept too broadly in resolving the fifth amendment
question raised by the civil investigative demand procedure.
The difference between administrative demands and
search warrants was definitively discussed in Oklahoma Press
in determining probable cause was not necessary for the issu-
ance of an administrative subpoena. 7
It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific
charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the
order be made pursuant to one. . . .The requirement of
"probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation," literally
applicable in the case of a warrant, is satisfied in that of an
order for production by the court's determination that the
investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Con-
gress can order, and the documents sought are relevant to the
inquiry. Beyond this the requirement of reasonableness, in-
cluding particularity in "describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized," also literally applica-
ble to warrants, comes down to specification of the docu-
ments to be produced adequate, but not excessive, for the
purposes of the relevant inquiry."
The investigative demand is in the nature of an administrative
subpoena and analogous to discovery proceedings with attend-
ant procedural safeguards for judicial protection of the investi-
gated party." The Kentucky Supreme Court in Pineur recog-
nized that investigative demands must be considered under the
Morton Salt standard and are not bound within the strict con-
fines of establishing probable cause."
The issue of a corporation's self-incrimination privileges
has long since been settled by the courts.9' A corporation is not
a "person" within the meaning of the self-incrimination provi-
I Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967).
327 U.S. at 208-09.
' See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
, Accord, 68 AM. JUR. 2d Searches and Seizure § 27 (1973).
"In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), the self-
incrimination argument was rather summarily dismissed by the Court, applying the
well-settled rule that corporations are not entitled to the privilege against self-
incrimination. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Essgee Co. v. United
States, 262 U.S. 151 (1924); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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sions of the fifth amendment, nor may Herb Jones, as a corpo-
rate officer, assert his personal fifth amendment privilege on
behalf of the corporation. 2 The Kentucky Supreme Court in
Pineur alluded to the difference between constitutional protec-
tions for natural persons and corporations, indicating a corpo-
ration's inability to assert all constitutional rights of natural
persons. 3 Thus, Herb Jones Chevrolet, Inc. is foreclosed from
challenging the investigative demand on fifth amendment
grounds.
A corporation's inability to raise the self-incrimination
issue does not, however, resolve the problem of potential indi-
vidual self-incrimination. The Kentucky statute is silent as to
use of information obtained from an investigative demand in
any subsequent criminal prosecution of a witness. 4 Further-
more, the statute provides for issuance of demands not only to
those persons suspected of committing unfair, false, mislead-
ing, or deceptive acts or practices, but also to "any person who.
is believed to have information, documentary material, or
physical evidence relevant to the alleged or suspected viola-
tion. 15 While most cases have revolved around the self-
incrimination issue as raised by a corporate witness, Ken-
tucky's statute leaves open the self-incrimination issue as it
relates to a natural person.
Although the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act is a civil
statute, 6 the United States Supreme Court has held that the
privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted "in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, administralve or judicial, inves-
92 See cases cited, note 91 supra. See George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid,
392 U.S. 286 (1968); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957); United States v.
Peter, 479 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1973); Hyster Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 183 (9th Cir.
1964). See also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
" 533 S.W.2d at 528 n.1.
" See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
' KRS § 367.240 (Supp. 1976).
" The Consumer Protection Act provides for traditional civil and equitable reme-
dies, injunctive relief under KRS § 367.190 as well as restitutionary and restorative
measures under KRS § 367.200. Furthermore, the Act provides for civil actions by
persons injured by violations of KRS § 367.170 to recover actual damages. KRS §
367.220. The statute does provide penalties; however it specifically provides that they
are "civil penalties." KRS § 367.990. See State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 510 P.2d 233 (Wash. 1973), holding that the existence of civil penalties
in a statute does not make the act a criminal statute; accord, Kugler v. Romain, 266
A.2d 144 (N.J. 1970), aff'd as modified, 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971).
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tigatory or adjudicatory."97 Thus the Kentucky Supreme Court
incorrectly held that fifth amendment rights are not involved
in a civil investigative demand proceeding. In Maness v.
Meyers, " the United States Supreme Court held that in a civil
case, a witness could assert the privilege if there were a reason-
able basis to assume that a risk of criminal prosecution ex-
isted.9
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
assures that an individual is not compelled to produce evi-
dence which later may be used against him as an accused in
a criminal action. . . .The protection does not merely en-
compass evidence which may lead to criminal conviction, but
includes information which would furnish a link in the chain
of evidence that could lead to prosecution, as well as evidence
which an individual reasonably believes could be used
against him in a criminal prosecution.'0
Since a violation of the Consumer Protection Act would
not subject a person to a criminal or penal sanction under the
Act, the mere issuance of an investigative demand would not
violate the privilege against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, if
a specific question were asked and if there were a reasonable
belief that the answer would tend to incriminate a person indi-
vidually in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the question
could be challenged by objection,101 and the court could then
determine if the objection were proper.102 Since the danger of
criminal self-incrimination must be a substantial probability,
the validity of such a claim in an investigation of possible
" Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 464 (1975); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,
77 (1973); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
' 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
The precise holding in the case was that a lawyer may not be held in contempt
for advising his client during the trial of a civil case to refuse to produce material
demanded by a subpoena duces tecum when the lawyer believes in good faith the
material may tend to incriminate his client. Id. at 468.
'0 Id. at 461.
"I Objections to an investigative demand can be presented to a court in at least
three ways. Under KRS § 367.240(2) a petition to modify or set aside a demand, stating
good cause, can be filed in court. Under KRS § 367.260 an application for a protective
order from unreasonable investigative action taken by the Attorney General can be
presented to the court. If the Attorney General seeks to enforce an investigative de-
mand by a court order under KRS § 367.290(2), a hearing on the merits of an investiga-
tive demand must be held before issuance of a final order.
M 81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 36 (1975).
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unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices is re-
mote indeed. The Court's decision in Herb Jones Chevrolet,
however, appears to foreclose raising the fifth amendment issue
in a civil investigative demand proceeding.
Despite the widespread approval of Oklahoma Press and
Morton Salt, the distinction between accusatorial and
inquisitorial fact-finding, which is the foundation of the
Oklahoma Press-Morton Salt theory of administrative investi-
gations, has not gone unchallenged. The grand jury analogy1
3
has been criticized as improper since the grand jury is a body
of citizens standing between other citizens and the govern-
ment, while an administrative agency is an arm of the state
staffed by government employees.' 4 Furthermore, the accusa-
torial/inquisitorial dichotomy' 5 has not been so significant
since the rise of administrative "due process."'0 6 In light of
these factors, the Court should have confined its fifth amend-
ment holding in Herb Jones Chevrolet to the rights of the cor-
poration without generally eliminating self-incrimination pro-
tections from the civil investigative demand procedure.
Pineur and Herb Jones Chevrolet have left the Attorney
General with broad power to seek information regarding possi-
ble violations of the Consumer Protection Act. These cases
follow the rationale of Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt and
to that extent are not novel or unexpected. The Court, however,
0o3 See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
" See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 498 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Brief
for Appellee at 13-16, Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Pineur, 533 S.W.2d 527 (Ky.
1976).
05 For further discussion of the inquisitorial/accusatorial dichotomy in adminis-
trative proceedings, see Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969); Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420 (1959); Haines v. Askew, 368 F. Supp. 369 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 417
U.S. 901 (1974); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Lopez, 531 P.2d 455 (Kan. 1975).
"' For thorough discussions of the need for due process in administrative investi-
gations, see, e.g., Chaney, The Need for Constitutional Protection for Defendants in
Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478 (1974); Rogge, An Overview of Adminis-
trative Due Process, 19 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1973); Murchison, Rights of Persons Compelled
to Appear in Federal Agency Investigational Hearings, 62 MicH. L. REv. 485 (1964);
Rogge, Inquisitions by OfficiaLs: A Study of Due Process Requirements in Administra-
tive Investigations, 47 MINN. L. REV. 939 (1963), 48 MINN. L. REv. 557, 1081 (1964);
Newman, Due Process, Investigations, and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 735 (1961);
Note, Constitutional Rights and Administrative Investigations: Suggested Limitations
on the Inquisitorial Powers of the Federal Agencies, 58 GEORGEtOWN L. J. 345 (1969).
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need not have reached as far in its decisions in wiping out self-
incrimination protections and apprisal rights in investigative
demand proceedings.
Although the Court has resolved the issue of the validity
of investigative demands, the Court in both Pineur and Herb
Jones Chevrolet left open the question of the proper scope of
investigative demands.1 7 This issue requires analysis of the
Oklahoma Press-Morton Salt standard for judging administra-
tive investigations.
IV. SCOPE OF AN INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND
While the three-part test in Oklahoma Press and Morton
Salt defined the parameters of administrative investigative
authority, that test should not be regarded as a talisman. 8
Unfortunately, most courts have been unwilling to analyze and
appraise informational demands critically, leaving administra-
tive agencies with an almost unbridled authority to investi-
gate."' Because the courts have been reluctant to restrict ad-
ministrative investigations, there may be little comfort to one
challenging an investigative demand that relief from arbitrary
administrative action is provided by way of court review. This
concern by those being investigated is even more understanda-
ble since the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Pineur
that the courts would determine the reasonableness of a de-
mand in light of the standards established by Morton Salt.
Thus, in defining the reasonableness of a demand," 0 the court
not only should place emphasis on the three-part test of
Oklahoma Press-Morton Salt but also should balance the inter-
est of the Attorney General and the Division of Consumer Pro-
tection in issuing an investigative demand and the rights and
obligations of an investigated party in responding to a demand.
' Although the Court did provide standards to determine the proper scope of a
demand, the Court declined to review the reasonableness of the demand issued to
Pineur and the possible overbreadth of the demand issued to Herb Jones Chevrolet
since the lower courts had not made a finding on these questions.
I" Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
'" See, e.g., Note, Resisting Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas Duces
Tecum: Another Look at CAB v. Hermann, 69 YALE L. J. 131 (1959); Comment,
Enforcement of the Administrative Subpoena: An Abdication of Judicial Inquiry, 27
ALBANY L. REv. 239 (1963).
,,I See generally GELLHORN & BYsE, supra note 76, at 490-504; CooPin, supra note
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A. Agency Authority to Investigate
Two aspects of the Consumer Protection Act are pertinent
to this factor. The statute buttresses the functions, powers, and
duties of the Division of Consumer Protection with investiga-
tive authority over matters affecting consumer affairs."' How-
ever, the issuance of an investigative demand is much more
limited to determinations of whether violations of the Act have
been committed or are about to be committed."2 Thus the
broad scope of investigative authority over matters affecting
consumer affairs would not sanction the issuance of an investi-
gative demand.13 Absent a showing that the investigation re-
lated to a determination of unlawful acts or practices,"' the
investigative demand would be void. If the proper showing were
made, however, the demand could be issued to any person with
relevant information." 5
B. Relevancy
The relevancy issue is difficult for the recipient of the de-
mand to overcome. The court's inquiry is usually limited to
whether the requested information might possibly be useful,
not that it will in fact be useful."' Once an initial showing of
I KRS § 367.150(3) (Supp. 1976).
112 KRS § 367.240 (Supp. 1976).
1 For example, the Consumers' Advisory Council established by KRS § 367.130
acts in an advisory capacity on consumer affairs, making recommendations to the
governor, attorney general, and legislative branch of the government. The. Council
frequently holds hearings on proposed consumer legislation and makes recommenda-
tions for passage. Although the Consumers' Advisory Council is aided in information
gathering by the Division of Consumer Protection, issuance of an investigative demand
to aid in Council hearings or acquisitions of information would clearly be beyond the
statutory authority of the investigative demand. See CONSUMERS' ADVISORY COUNCIL,
STATE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS IN KENTUCKY 3-4 (1975).
"I KRS § 367.175 was added to the Consumer Protection Act in 1976 declaring
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce unlawful.
Since prohibition of unlawful antitrust activity has been included in the Consumer
Protection Act, investigative demands will be available for antitrust investigations.
Ironically, Governor Carroll vetoed a similar antitrust bill which provided for issuance
of investigative demands in antitrust investigations. The bill also provided for investi-
gative powers of subpoena and impoundment of evidence similar to those in the Con-
sumer Protection Act. The bill was vetoed apparently because the investigative powers
were thought too broad. See Louisville Courier Journal & Times, March 21, 1976, § A
at 1, 24.
"5 KRS § 367.240 (Supp. 1976). See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
116 GELLHORN & BYSE, supra note 76, at 496.
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reasonable relevance has been made by the agency, a heavy
burden of persuasion is shifted to the recipient to establish
irrelevancy. "
The Pineur decision indicated in essence that the relev-
ance of the Attorney General's request for information need not
be shown on the face of the demand in the form of grounds or
factual details. Certainly this view does not conflict with the
judicial role since the court must make a factual determination
of relevance regardless of whether any grounds are stated on
the face of the demand. The disturbing aspect of Pineur is that
unless the recipient has been apprised of the nature of the
investigation, there is no ground for the recipient to determine
whether the information sought is relevant or not. This is unde-
sirable for two reasons. The recipient may answer an improper
demand "solely because of the air of authority with which the
demand is made,"' 8 thus waiving his constitutional rights. Or
the recipient may needlessly challenge a relevant investigative
demand, causing undue delay and expense in resolving the
matter under investigation.
To avoid either of these possibilities, the Division of Con-
sumer Protection should adopt a procedure similar to that
employed by the Federal Trade Commission: "Any person
under investigation compelled or requested to furnish informa-
tion or documentary material shall be advised with respect to
the purpose and scope of the investigation.""' 9 Such a proce-
dure would not burden the Division, ' but could possibly avoid
unnecessary challenges to investigative demands and expedite
investigations of unfair, false, misleading, and deceptive acts
or practices.'"' Whether the Division would choose to adopt as
' CooPER, supra note 16, at 301.
"' Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 219 (1946) (Murphy,
J., dissenting).
' 16 C.F.R. § 2.6 (1976).
" A prefatory statement of purpose would be sufficient. Consider the following
example:
The Attorney General, pursuant to KRS § 367.240 has reason to believe that
Herb Jones Chevrolet, Inc. may have engaged in unfair, false, misleading,
and deceptive acts or practices in violation of KRS § 367.170, in its charges
for sales and use tax in the purchase of used automobiles, and the Attorney
General believes it to be in the public interest to investigate Herb Jones
Chevrolet, Inc. with respect to its charges for sales and use tax.
121 The investigative demand to Herb Jones Chevrolet, Inc. was issued on January
21, 1974. Three years later, the demand still remains unanswered.
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policy that which it has successfully opposed as law is another
matter.
C. Specificity
This final requirement of the Oklahoma Press-Morton Salt
test has been perhaps the least analyzed aspect of administra-
tive investigations. Since investigative demands involve re-
quests for information at a preliminary stage of investigation,
the demands are frequently challenged as being either too
broadly drawn or too loosely identified. The requirement of
adequate specificity is usually not difficult for the agency to
meet since a description is sufficiently specific if the requested
document can be identified by the recipient of the demand.
2 2
Likewise, the claim of overbreadth or undue burden is usually
dismissed unless there is a showing that the request was de-
signed for harassment rather than discovery.
23
Since the courts appear unwilling to invalidate sweeping
demands for information, the recipient should frame his chal-
lenge in terms of modifying rather than invalidating the de-
mand. In this context, courts should be more active in examin-
ing the requests in the demand. Rather than taking all infor-
mational demands at face value, courts should frame the de-
mand to satisfy the interests of both the Division of Consumer
Protection and the business community.
While courts are empowered to modify demands consid-
ered overbroad, burdensome, or vague,'24 initial requests for
modification or extension of time to answer should be made to
the Division itself. Such procedure not only expedites commu-
nication between the Division and the recipient, but also pre-
vents the formal adversary relationship inherent in seeking a
court order.'12 This good faith attempt at compromise can pro-
tect the interests of both the consuming public and the busi-
ness community while insuring a cooperative and confidential
12 CooPER, supra note 16, at 310.
" Id. at 304.
2I KRS § 367.240(2) (Supp. 1976).
'2 The uncertainty as to how courts will apply the Morton Salt standard coupled
with the Supreme Court's broad approval of the civil investigative demand procedure
should encourage recipients of demands to negotiate. The Division should also be more
willing to negotiate rather than subjecting investigative demands to lower court review.
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procedure in defining the proper scope of an investigative de-
mand."
CONCLUSION
The principles guiding the enforceability of civil investiga-
tive demands have their genesis in the decisions of Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling and United States v. Morton
Salt Co. Those cases provide a broad framework through which
administrative agencies, like the Kentucky Division of Con-
sumer Protection, can investigate and make determinations of
fact essential to the ongoing character of their responsibilities
and duties.
The Consumer Protection Act provides for issuance of a
civil investigative demand in a precomplaint investigation of
possible unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts or prac-
tices. The Kentucky Supreme Court's recent decisions in
Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Pineur and Commonwealth
ex rel. Stephens v. Herb Jones Chevrolet, Inc. cast that proce-
dure within the standards established by Morton Salt for judg-
ing the validity of a precomplaint, preadjudicative investiga-
tion. Those standards require only that the informational de-
mand be made within the authority of the agency and that the
information sought be reasonably relevant and not too indefi-
nite.
While courts will be called upon to determine the
reasonableness of investigative demands, informal procedures
between the Division of Consumer Protection and the business
community suggest a more constructive approach to resolving
disputes over the contents of investigative demands. The Divi-
sion should routinely inform the recipient of an investigative
demand of the nature or purpose of the investigation, even
though this is not statutorily required. Initially the recipient of
a demand should attempt compromise with the Division rather
than invoking the formal authority of the court if a demand is
deemed objectionable. Finally the court, when called upon to
examine an investigative demand, should disregard an all-or-
nothing approach, and if necessary should revise informational
"I See Davis, Investigations By the Department of Justice-As Seen By the Po-
tential Defendant, 29 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 54 (1965).
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requests in light of the modem standards, so as to best serve
the interests of the consuming public and the business com-
munity.
With the increased responsibilities of the Division of Con-
sumer Protection, the fact-finding capabilities provided in the
Consumer Protection Act should not be restricted.
The words of the Consumer Protection Act do not describe
the Attorney General as a passive bystander, but, rather, as
an aggressive and determined protector of the interests of the
consuming public and the reputable business community. To
be true to the provisions of the Act, to be able to properly
educate the public about consumer issues, to be in a knowl-
edgeable position to recommend better consumer protection
legislation to the General Assembly, and to be able to clearly
frame issues of [unfair,] fraudulent, misleading, or decep-
tive business practices in Kentucky, it is necessary that the
Attorney General be able to act on his own initiative and with
the aid of an effective investigative power in order to provide
more preventive than remedial public services and to make
the Consumer Protection Act an effective servant of honest
consumers and businessmen alike. I2
The authority to issue a civil investigative demand is an inte-
gral part of this investigative power. 128 The Kentucky Supreme
Court's decisions in Pineur and Herb Jones Chevrolet are a
welcomed reaffirmation of the Attorney General's precom-
plaint investigative authority under the Consumer Protection
Act. Unfortunately, the Court unnecessarily restricted the in-
vestigated party's privilege against self-incrimination and right
to notice of the nature and purpose of the investigation. If the
Consumer Protection Act is to be an effective servant of both
consumers and honest businessmen, future decisions will have
to account not only for the Attorney General's need for infor-
mation but also for the investigated party's right to adminis-
trative and constitutional due process.
Jon E. Pancake
,27 Brief for Appellant at 21, Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Pineur, 533
S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1976).
' In 1975, 291 investigations were initiated by the Division of Consumer Protec-
tion. While not all of these investigations resulted in the issuance of an investigative
demand, all were concerned with possible false, misleading, or deceptive acts or prac-
tices. CONSUMERS' ADVISORY COUNCIL, STATE OF CONSuMER AFFAIRs I KENTUCKY 8
(1975).
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